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INTRODUCTION 
In their article, Forging Food Justice Through Cooperatives in New 
York City, Dan DePasquale, Surbhi Sarang, and Natalie Bump Vena 
(the “Authors”) argue that consumer-owned and worker-owned 
cooperatives hold promise as a means for advancing policy objectives 
associated with “food justice,” namely building community wealth 
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and power and providing more affordable access to healthy food in 
low-income and minority communities.1  Looking to examples of 
legislation and policies in other jurisdictions, they advocate for a wide 
range of policies to promote the viability of cooperatives in New York 
City, including reforms to cooperative corporation laws and strategies 
for better allocating funding and technical assistance to cooperatives.2 
I largely agree with the Authors’ argument and support their effort 
to identify practical policy solutions that would help food 
cooperatives in New York City overcome barriers to success.  This 
Response makes three observations about their proposals.  First, this 
Response observes that food access and economic development are 
distinct objectives and that consumer and worker cooperatives may 
have different roles to play in food justice strategies depending on 
how these objectives are defined and prioritized.  Second, the 
significance of cooperative corporation statutes may be overstated, 
both because a variety of legal entity forms are available to 
cooperative organizations (mitigating the impact of potential reforms 
to New York’s cooperative corporation law) and because the legal 
form itself does not guarantee adoption of many of the values and 
principles commonly associated with cooperatives.  Third, this 
Response argues that the role of other, non-cooperative 
organizational models should not be overlooked in shaping policy in 
this area.  This Response advocates for a more comprehensive 
strategy that promotes a wide range of community-based businesses 
and organizations, including but not limited to cooperatives, and that 
allocates resources according to the identity of organizations’ 
stakeholders and the degree of their community impact, rather than 
relying on their legal form. 
I.  DISTINGUISHING AND CATEGORIZING POLICY OBJECTIVES AND 
TYPES OF COOPERATIVES 
This Part briefly parses the policy objectives and categories of 
cooperative models identified in the Author’s article, before 
proceeding with an analysis of the Authors’ proposals in Parts II and 
III.  The objectives of the “food justice movement” identified by the 
Authors can be categorized into two central goals: the first, to 
“redress food insecurity as well as other inequities throughout the 
food system,” by such means as establishing “alternative pathways for 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See generally Dan DePasquale et al., Forging Food Justice Through 
Cooperatives in New York City, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 909 (2018). 
 2. See generally id. at 937–49. 
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bringing healthy food” to underserved communities,3 and the second, 
“the economic development and revival of communities and the 
creation of sustainable livelihoods.”4  They observe that in both cases, 
the “food justice” approach emphasizes community-driven solutions 
to structural inequities.5 
It is worth noting that food access and economic development are 
related, but nevertheless distinct, policy objectives.  Further, “food 
access” itself is a loaded term, connoting a much-disputed narrative 
that lack of physical proximity to healthy food causes food insecurity 
and diet-related health disparities.6  Scholars have persuasively 
argued that the root causes of such disparities are in fact poverty and 
other socioeconomic factors, and have observed that “food access” 
strategies aimed at increasing proximity to healthy food in low-
income neighborhoods—in particular, efforts to bring supermarkets 
to perceived “food deserts”—have largely been ineffective in 
changing health outcomes.7  Law professor Nathan Rosenberg and 
public health professor Nevin Cohen criticize food policy that has 
“emphasized subsidizing conventional food retailers to increase food 
access while shifting attention from the more fundamental upstream 
causes of malnourishment and health disparities: social inequality, 
race, gender, class oppression, and poverty.”8  Similarly, law 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Id. at 915–16. 
 4. Id. at 916 (quoting ROBERT GOTTLIEB & ANUPAMA JOSHI, FOOD JUSTICE 227 
(2013)). 
 5. Id. at 916. 
 6. In assessing links between poverty and diet-related health outcomes, 
policymakers have often focused on the presence of “food deserts”—“communities, 
both urban and rural, with severely limited access to healthy and affordable food”—
and framed the issue largely as one of proximity. Deborah Archer & Tamara 
Belinanti, We Built It and They Did Not Come: Using New Governance Theory in 
the Fight for Food Justice in Low-Income Communities of Color, 15 SEATTLE J. FOR 
SOC. JUST. 307, 308, 312–13 (2016). Based on that diagnosis, in recent years there 
have been significant subsidies and incentives allocated to the development of 
grocery stores in communities considered food deserts, most notably the federal 
Healthy Food Financing Initiative. Id. at 312–13.  However, several recent studies 
have found that the food choices people make are driven primarily by food 
preference rather than proximity to supermarkets.  A National Bureau of Economic 
Research Study found that “[p]articipants who were low-income and had lower levels 
of education but who lived in wealthier communities with proximity to healthy foods 
made food choices that were similar to the choices made by low-income people living 
in low-income neighborhoods with less physical access to healthy food.” Id. at 313–
14. 
 7. See Archer & Belinanti, supra note 6, at 311–12. See generally Nathan A. 
Rosenberg & Nevin Cohen, Let Them Eat Kale: The Misplaced Narrative of Food 
Access, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1091 (2018). 
 8. Rosenberg & Cohen, supra note 7, at 1120. 
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professors Deborah Archer and Tamara Belinanti criticize 
interventions that embrace a “myopic narrative of food 
access . . . centered around problems of proximity,” arguing that “true 
access” to food is largely an issue of its affordability and cultural 
appropriateness.9  These critiques suggest that, in crafting policy 
around food justice-related concerns, policymakers should prioritize 
wealth creation and should take a broader and more nuanced 
approach to “food access.” 
As a related point, consumer cooperatives and worker cooperatives 
are inherently different structures and consequently may have 
different roles to play in policy strategies.  Quite simply, consumer 
cooperatives are organized for the benefit of consumers and worker 
cooperatives are organized for the benefit of workers.10  As the 
Authors observe, these structural features indicate that consumer 
cooperatives have the potential to increase affordable food access and 
worker cooperatives have the potential to create sustainable 
community wealth.11  Of course, neither model is homogeneous; 
consumer cooperatives may adopt policies focused on community job 
creation just as worker cooperatives may adopt policies focused on 
food access.  Further, hybrid or “solidarity” cooperatives, like the 
Central Co-op in Seattle, may feature both consumer and worker 
ownership.12  Nevertheless, the core structural differences between 
the two cooperative models imply different policy considerations, and 
it therefore may not be effective to group the two together in all 
strategies. 
II.  THE LIMITATIONS OF LEGAL FORMS 
The Authors recommend improving the New York Cooperative 
Corporations Law (“NYCCL”) as one solution for overcoming 
barriers to the success of both consumer and worker cooperatives 
(and, by extension, furthering food justice objectives), but this 
strategy may overstate the significance of a cooperative’s legal form 
for two reasons.13  First, the constraints of the NYCCL are relatively 
insignificant as a practical matter because, quite simply, cooperative 
organizations in New York are not limited to incorporating under the 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Archer & Belinanti, supra note 6, at 311–12. 
 10. DePasquale et al., supra note 1, at 918–19. 
 11. Id. at 922, 924–25. 
 12. Co-op Governance, CENTRAL CO-OP, https://www.centralcoop.coop/
governance.php [https://perma.cc/GP5Z-GCQK]. 
 13. See generally DePasquale et al., supra note 1, at 942, 944–45. 
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NYCCL.14  Rather, they can employ the same cooperative principles 
and enjoy the same favorable treatment under federal law by taking 
advantage of more flexible legal entity forms such as the limited 
liability company (“LLC”).15  Liberalizing the NYCCL presents only 
a limited upside and comes with a risk of eroding the signaling power 
of “cooperative” as a corporate name.  Second, and more 
importantly, adopting the cooperative corporation legal form does 
not guarantee that an organization will embody all of the principles 
that are often cited as benefits of cooperatives.  Therefore, policy 
solutions that focus entirely on legal form, rather than on how an 
organization operates or whom it benefits, risk missing the mark. 
A. New York Cooperative Corporation Law 
To support their proposal to improve the NYCCL as a means of 
supporting consumer and worker cooperatives, the Authors look to 
other domestic and international cooperative legal regimes as 
examples.  They primarily focus on reforms that would make the 
cooperative corporation a more flexible legal entity.16  As an example 
of a more flexible state statute, they cite Minnesota’s cooperative 
corporation law, which permits non-patron investors to hold equity in 
cooperative corporations coupled with limited voting rights.17  As an 
international example, they cite the Quebec Cooperatives Act, which 
provides the option of forming a “solidarity cooperative,” a hybrid 
form of cooperative with multiple classes of stakeholders as 
members.18 
While there are certainly other legal regimes that provide more 
flexibility than the NYCCL, loosening the constraints of the NYCCL 
may have limited practical benefits for a simple reason: organizations 
that wish to operate as cooperatives in New York are not limited to 
the cooperative corporation statute.19  As noted by the Authors,20 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Edward W. De Barbieri & Brian Glick, Legal Entity Options for Worker 
Cooperatives, 2 GRASSROOTS ECON. ORGANIZING NEWSL. (2011), http://geo.coop/
node/628 [https://perma.cc/79JP-WAZ8]. 
 15. Id. 
 16. The other legal features that the Authors identify in other jurisdictions as 
potential improvements include a host of benefits bestowed on cooperatives in Italy, 
including certain income tax and banking law exemptions. DePasquale et al., supra 
note 1, at 940–41.  A cross-border comparative analysis of cooperative regulatory 
exemptions would be a worthwhile endeavor, but is outside the scope of this 
Response. 
 17. Id. at 938–39. 
 18. Id. at 941. 
 19. De Barbieri & Glick, supra note 14. 
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cooperatives may be formed as New York LLCs or potentially other 
business entities that incorporate cooperative principles into their 
constitutive documents, rather than forming as cooperative 
corporations under the NYCCL.21  LLC statutes offer a highly 
flexible form, wherein LLCs can incorporate cooperative principles 
while also permitting non-patron equity investments and can 
accommodate any permutation of hybrid cooperative structures with 
multiple stakeholders.22  In fact, many cooperative organizations in 
New York choose to form as LLCs.23  The principal benefit under 
federal law of operating as a cooperative—the exemption of 
patronage dividends from the cooperative’s income tax pursuant to 
Subchapter T of the Internal Revenue Code—does not depend on an 
entity’s designation under state law.24  Rather, it applies if an entity 
that is considered a corporation for federal tax purposes is “operating 
on a cooperative basis.”25  An LLC that elects to be considered a 
corporation for tax purposes is eligible to be taxed as a cooperative so 
long as it is operating in a way that satisfies the Subchapter T 
requirements.26  An LLC that elects to be considered a partnership 
for tax purposes qualifies for pass-through taxation, generally making 
exemption under Subchapter T unnecessary.27  Therefore, forming a 
cooperative under the NYCCL does not provide any particular tax 
advantage, and in fact provides less flexibility in tax treatment, as 
compared to forming as an LLC. 
The principal advantage of incorporating under the NYCCL rather 
than as an LLC is that only NYCCL cooperative corporations are 
                                                                                                                 
 20. DePasquale et al., supra note 1, at 932. 
 21. De Barbieri & Glick, supra note 14. 
 22. Id. 
 23. In the New York City food sector, cooperatives formed as LLCs include 
Brooklyn Packers LLC, a worker cooperative that sources, portions, and packages 
food, and Bed-Stuy Fresh and Local LLC. See The Brooklyn Packers, BECOMING 
EMPLOYEE OWNED: DEMOCRACY AT WORK INST., http://becomingemployee
owned.org/projects/the-brooklyn-packers/ [https://perma.cc/3WUE-CS6F]; Oscar 
Perry Abello, Brooklyn Grocery Proving Cooperative Business Works, NEXT CITY 
(Jan. 26, 2016), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/bed-stuy-organic-grocery-proving-
cooperative-business-works [https://perma.cc/LY93-2CX5]. 
 24. I.R.C. § 1381(a)(2) (2017). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Thomas Earl Geu & James B. Dean, The New Uniform Limited Cooperative 
Association Act: A Capital Idea for Principled Self-Help Value Added Firms, 
Community-Based Economic Development, and Low-Profit Joint Ventures, 44 REAL 
PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 55, 91–94 (2009) (citing I.R.S. Priv. Ltr Rul. 01-39-020 (Sept. 28, 
2001)). 
 27. Elaine Waterhouse Wilson, Cooperatives: The First Social Enterprise, 
66 DEPAUL L. REV. 1013, 1040 (2017). 
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permitted to use the term “cooperative” or any variations thereof in 
their legal name.28  This prohibition was designed to preserve the 
integrity of special words used in corporate names and avoid 
confusion.29  Depending on the organization, this distinction may be 
significant—particularly in the context of consumer food 
cooperatives, the inclusion of the word “co-op” may play an 
important role in marketing to consumers.  But the restriction is 
limited to an organization’s corporate name and does not prohibit a 
non-NYCCL organization from otherwise publicizing that it employs 
cooperative principles.30 
While liberalizing the NYCCL to afford greater structural 
flexibility creates a limited benefit, there is potential downside to 
doing so as well.  As noted by the Authors, the introduction of 
outside equity investors, as exemplified by Minnesota’s cooperative 
law, may result in the diminishment of patron members’ earnings.31  
The more flexible a cooperative statute becomes, the less it will 
conform to traditional notions of how cooperatives operate.  Indeed, 
some members of the cooperative community have voiced concern 
about “new generation cooperatives” that raise outside equity capital, 
with one commentator observing that “some new generation 
businesses appear to have adopted more of an ‘investor’ rather than 
‘user’ culture.”32  It is unsettled where to draw the line for how far an 
organization can depart from a traditional cooperative format before 
it should no longer be considered a “cooperative.”  Nevertheless, 
there is good reason to draw a line somewhere.  As long as 
organizations have the option of adopting creative and unorthodox 
structures through flexible legal forms like LLCs, the primary 
function of the NYCCL is to ensure that when an organization 
identifies itself as a cooperative, it comports with a common 
understanding of what that word means. 
B. The Risk of Making Policy Based on Cooperatives as a Legal 
Form 
There is a further risk in tying policy entirely to the legal form of 
cooperatives.  As noted by the Authors, cooperatives often embody 
values and principles associated with “food justice,” including 
                                                                                                                 
 28. N.Y. COOP. CORP. LAW § 3(j) (McKinney 2017). 
 29. 1970 N.Y. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 31 (N.Y.A.G.), 1970 WL 197708, at *1. 
 30. N.Y. COOP. CORP. LAW § 3(j). 
 31. DePasquale et al., supra note 1, at 939. 
 32. Wilson, supra note 27, at 1038 (quoting Randall E. Torgerson et al., Evolution 
of Cooperative Thought, Theory, and Purpose, 13 J. COOPERATIVES 1, 13 (1998)). 
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empowerment of low-income communities, civic engagement, and 
environmental stewardship.33  However, the cooperative corporation 
legal form required by the NYCCL itself does not dictate that an 
organization embody these principles.  Therefore, there is a risk in 
tying policy entirely to the organizational form of a cooperative. 
Commentators frequently associate certain values and principles 
with cooperatives that go beyond the core identifying elements that 
distinguish them from more traditional business forms.34  The 
International Cooperative Alliance (“ICA”), a non-profit 
international association established in 1895 to advance the 
cooperative model, has adopted the following set of seven principles 
for cooperatives: (1) voluntary and open membership; (2) democratic 
member control; (3) member economic participation; (4) autonomy 
and independence; (5) education, training, and information; 
(6) cooperation among cooperatives; and (7) concern for 
community.35  In an article exploring the opportunities for, and 
limitations of, worker cooperatives serving as platforms for grassroots 
political activism, law professor Gowri Krishna observes that of the 
ICA’s seven principles, only the second and third, democratic 
member control and member economic participation, are inherent 
features of the cooperative corporate form.36  Certainly, the 
democratic nature of those two features creates a framework that is 
conducive to more outward-looking principles like education and 
concern for community.  But as noted by Krishna, the cooperative’s 
foundational “one-person, one-vote” democratic structure merely sets 
a floor from which those outward-looking principles may be built, 
rather than guaranteeing they will be embraced.37 
A cooperative may exist primarily to benefit its members without 
any larger, outward-facing, community value-oriented goals.  Or, in 
what is perhaps a more typical scenario, a cooperative may pursue 
some value-oriented goals at the expense of other goals.  In a case 
study of two urban food cooperatives in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
                                                                                                                 
 33. DePasquale et al., supra note 1, at 910–11, 924–25. 
 34. Gowri J. Krishna, Worker Cooperative Creation as Progressive Lawyering? 
Moving Beyond the One-Person, One-Vote Floor, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
65, 83 (2013) (citing Kimberly Zeuli & Jamie Radel, Cooperatives as a Community 
Development Strategy: Linking Theory and Practice, 35 J. REGIONAL ANALYSIS & 
POL’Y 43, 44 (2005)). 
 35. Krishna, supra note 34, at 83–84; see also Co-operative Identity, Values & 
Principles, INT’L COOP. ALL., https://ica.coop/en/whats-co-op/co-operative-identity-
values-principles [https://perma.cc/6RWT-PBW4]. 
 36. Krishna, supra note 34, at 84. 
 37. Id. 
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urban studies professor Andrew Zitcer identifies a “paradox of 
exclusivity” facing consumer food cooperatives.38  When food co-ops 
prioritize serving healthy, local, organic foods, prices tend to be high, 
in effect excluding low-income consumers.39  When food co-ops 
require member labor, often with the express intent to be more 
inclusive by making food affordable to anyone willing to commit time, 
prices are lower but access is limited to those who can afford to take 
uncompensated time, again potentially excluding low-income people 
as well as single parents.40  As a result, notwithstanding commonly 
espoused values of democratic inclusion, consumer food cooperatives 
are frequently perceived as elitist, white spaces.41  As noted by the 
Authors, “[n]ew consumer food cooperatives” that have opened in 
historically low-income and minority communities, for example, have 
faced criticisms that they functionally “serve new, white, middle-class 
transplants to these areas and contribute to displacement of long-time 
residents,” rather than meeting their needs.42 
How, then, can policy strategies better tap into the positive 
potential of cooperatives in addressing the issues identified by the 
Authors?  As noted above in Part I, an important first step is 
recognizing that different policy objectives may call for different 
approaches, and that worker cooperatives and consumer cooperatives 
may serve different purposes.  But even accounting for those 
differences, relying on basic categories of cooperatives may be 
insufficient.  Different consumer food cooperatives, for example, may 
have widely different priorities regarding price of food, qualities of 
food (including organic, local, etc.), member labor requirements, and 
other inclusive practices.43  A potential solution is for policy strategies 
to focus more on what a business does, and who benefits from that 
activity, than on its corporate form.  Such an approach not only helps 
to identify the “right” cooperatives to support but also, as explored in 
the next section, widens the policy lens beyond cooperatives. 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Andrew Zitcer, Food Co-ops and the Paradox of Exclusivity, 47 ANTIPODE 
812, 813 (2015). 
 39. Id. at 820. 
 40. Id. at 818. 
 41. Id. at 813; see also Rachel Slocum, Whiteness, Space and Alternative Food 
Practice, 38 GEOFORUM 520, 531 (2007) (identifying “whiteness” as “an organizing 
feature of alternative food practices” more generally). 
 42. DePasquale et al., supra note 1, at 937. 
 43. Zitcer, supra note 38, at 817–21. 
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III.  BEYOND COOPERATIVES: THE ROLE OF OTHER ENTERPRISE 
MODELS 
Cooperatives may be well suited as vehicles for reducing economic 
and health disparities in food systems, as argued by the Authors, but 
they are not alone in this respect.  The benefits cited by the Authors 
include both the opportunities for job and wealth creation associated 
with the commercial aspects of cooperatives and the opportunities for 
education, civic engagement, environmental impact, and affordability 
associated with the value-oriented aspects of cooperatives.44  In some 
cases, a cooperative may serve as the perfect organizational model for 
combining business with more value-oriented purposes in order to 
achieve the policy objectives identified by the Authors.  However, 
while cooperatives are unique in their democratic business structure, 
they are far from the only type of enterprise that can achieve these 
goals.  Sometimes a non-cooperative enterprise may be a natural and 
effective fit for the stakeholders involved.  As explored below, there 
is an important role that entrepreneurs starting more traditional for-
profit businesses, as well as non-profit organizations, can play in 
reducing economic and health disparities in food systems.45  This is 
not to say that policymakers should not find ways to promote 
cooperatives.  Rather, this Part makes the case that to combat the 
inequities associated with excessive corporate consolidation in the 
food system, they should promote a wide range of community-based 
businesses and organizations, with allocation of resources based on 
criteria beyond an organization’s legal entity type. 
Before proceeding with an analysis of the role of cooperative and 
non-cooperative enterprises in addressing disparities in food systems, 
it should be acknowledged that attempting to address these issues 
through the promotion of business enterprise—whether cooperative 
or otherwise—is a decidedly market-based solution. Scholars have 
critiqued market-based food policies as “perpetuating the neoliberal 
logics that underlie many of the structural problems we have in 
today’s food system.”46  This Response does not suggest that 
                                                                                                                 
 44. DePasquale et al., supra note 1, at 910–11, 923. 
 45. See infra Sections III.B, III.C. 
 46. Michaela Oldfield, Farmers’ Cooperatives to Regionalize Food Systems: A 
Critique of Local Food Law Scholarship and Suggestion for Critical Reconsideration 
of Existing Legal Tools for Changing the U.S. Food System, 47 ENVTL. L. 225, 256 
(collecting sources); see also Kate Meals, Nurturing the Seeds of Food Justice: 
Unearthing the Impact of Institutionalized Racism on Access to Healthy Food in 
Urban African-American Communities, 15 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE 
& SOC. JUST. 97, 128 (2012). 
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promoting certain business enterprises is the only solution, or even 
the primary solution, to the economic and health disparities that the 
food justice movement seeks to redress.  Rather, it suggests that these 
strategies have a part to play in complementing broader policy 
initiatives seeking to reform the food system.  In part, this is a 
pragmatic response that acknowledges deeper structural reform may 
be less politically viable.  But it is also an approach that is consistent 
with the food justice ethos of seeking community-based alternatives 
to the conventional food system rather than relying on state or large 
corporate actors to intervene.47 
A. The Unique Advantages and Disadvantages of the 
Cooperative Structure 
In assessing the role that cooperatives can play in furthering food 
justice objectives, their unique corporate structure cuts two ways.  On 
the one hand, their democratic structure arguably makes them ideal 
vehicles for building wealth in a manner that keeps jobs, income, and 
profits in the community in which they are rooted, particularly in the 
case of worker cooperatives.48  On the other hand, depending on the 
objectives and resources of the stakeholders involved, the unique 
structure of a cooperative may not always be the best fit.  As noted by 
the Authors, starting any enterprise requires a great deal of time, 
energy, and resources, but a cooperative’s democratic self-
management structure in many ways requires more.49  In the case of a 
worker cooperative, members’ roles as owners require them to invest 
more time in work-related matters than they would if they were 
merely employees.50  Consumer cooperatives take a wide range of 
approaches regarding membership commitments—in particular, as to 
whether member labor is required—but in any case, members have a 
financial commitment and a role in governance that is not at play 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Garrett Broad observes that many community organizers and food justice 
advocates have “some paradoxical commonalities with limited government 
conservatives, having long ago given up on the dream that the federal government 
would one day intervene to fully remedy their predicament.” See Garrett M. Broad, 
After the White House Garden: Food Justice in the Age of Trump, 13 J. FOOD L. & 
POL’Y 33, 37 (2017). 
 48. See Carmen Huertas-Noble, Promoting Worker-Owned Cooperatives as a 
CED Empowerment Strategy: A Case Study of Colors and Lawyering in Support of 
Participatory Decision-Making and Meaningful Social Change, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 
255, 266 (2010). 
 49. See DePasquale et al., supra note 1, at 932–35. 
 50. See Krishna, supra note 34, at 95 (“Ongoing trainings, education, committee 
activities, and other business responsibilities require attention from members.”). 
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when a consumer anonymously purchases from a conventional food 
store.51  Further, due to their complex structure, both models typically 
require technical assistance beyond what is needed for a more 
traditional business.52  Success, therefore, requires the presence and 
commitment of members who can put in the necessary time, energy, 
and resources, which may present a limiting factor to the widespread 
adoption of cooperative structures. 
In addition to purely practical limitations, a cooperative’s essential 
nature as neither entirely profit-maximizing nor entirely value-
oriented may not always fit the goals of the relevant stakeholders or, 
from a broader policy perspective, the relevant policy objectives.  A 
cooperative inhabits a dual identity as both a commercial business 
and an association of cooperative members pursuing value-oriented 
goals—two identities that by their nature are in tension.53  Even when 
cooperatives do not adopt outward-facing, value-oriented goals such 
as improving the surrounding communities or the environment, their 
democratic structure itself implies values beyond pure wealth 
maximization.  Accordingly, a cooperative’s structure and governing 
documents typically limit the return a member can make on his or her 
equity.54  Low-income entrepreneurs who wish to create wealth for 
themselves may be better served by forming traditional for-profit 
businesses than cooperatives.  Conversely, both the commercial 
aspect of cooperatives and the fact that profits inure to the benefit of 
their members indicate that they are not committed purely to 
outward-facing, value-oriented goals.  A founder focused solely on 
value-oriented goals may find a non-profit organizational model to be 
more appropriate.  From a broader policy perspective, in those 
instances when the cooperative model is not the best fit, the policy 
objectives identified by the Authors may instead be served by 
promoting more traditional for-profit entrepreneurship and non-
profit organizations. 
                                                                                                                 
 51. See Zitcer, supra note 38, at 817–18. 
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B. The Role of For-Profit Businesses 
An essential element of the “food justice” objectives identified by 
the Authors is wealth and job creation in low-income communities.55  
As quoted by the Authors, Robert Gottlieb and Anupama Joshi 
argue that “[t]he food justice approach is centrally about jobs and 
communities and is inherently linked to the economic development 
and revival of communities and the creation of sustainable 
livelihoods.”56  To that end, the potential for job and wealth creation 
presented by low-income entrepreneurs starting traditional for-profit 
businesses should not be ignored. 
Small business development has played a large role in broader 
community economic growth strategies, with some scholars framing 
minority entrepreneurship as part of the quest for economic justice.57  
Without the same networks on which other entrepreneurs rely, 
entrepreneurs in low-income communities face additional challenges.  
For example: 
All entrepreneurs need capital, access to credit, sound legal advice, 
and help with accounting, business planning, and marketing.  Urban 
entrepreneurs, however, need something more.  They need business 
coaching, entrepreneurial networks, accessible business education, 
and access to social and human capital.58 
The success of entrepreneurs in low-income communities not only 
presents an opportunity for the creation of wealth as a general matter, 
but also comports with the value the food justice movement places on 
community-based alternatives to large corporate actors.  In particular, 
food justice activists have criticized policies that subsidize the 
presence of large grocery chains in communities perceived as “food 
deserts” without providing an opportunity for community-based 
businesses to fill the need.59 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See DePasquale et al., supra note 1, at 916. 
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However, a number of scholars have argued that “focused, 
individualistic, entrepreneurial strategies” have proved unsuccessful 
as a means of community economic development and poverty 
alleviation.60  Some of these scholars have advocated for more 
political, broad-based, and collectivist strategies for community 
economic development, including “living wage campaigns, worker 
cooperatives, and jobs initiatives, not the creation of small startup 
businesses.”61  But as observed by law professor Paul Tremblay, in 
the context of client selection for community economic development 
lawyers, even if assisting individual entrepreneurs falls short from the 
perspective of a broader social justice mission as compared to 
assisting more collectivist, community-building efforts, that does not 
mean doing so is without merit.62  Tremblay notes that: 
[Transactional legal services] on behalf of humbly-resourced 
entrepreneurs not only assists in the establishment of some tangible 
power that might otherwise elude low income clients, but, 
importantly, it is what the members of the community have 
requested.  It is a challenging posture, in the pursuit of rebellious 
lawyering, to resist what some members of a client community need 
because the lawyer understands that other avenues would be more 
fitting of a larger mission.63 
A similar argument can be made in the context of policy-making 
around food systems more generally.  It may be that a successful 
cooperative is the ideal mechanism for simultaneously growing wealth 
and furthering other value-oriented goals associated with food justice.  
But, as long as there are community members who prefer to build 
wealth through traditional entrepreneurship or instances where the 
cooperative model is simply not feasible, those opportunities for 
community wealth generation should not be ignored. 
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54 STAN. L. REV. 399 (2001)). 
 62. See Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Strains in Transactional Lawyering for 
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(2016). 
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C. The Role of Charitable Non-Profit Organizations 
Just as the collectivist, value-oriented aspects of the cooperative 
paradigm may not appeal to certain aspiring entrepreneurs, the 
commercial aspects of the cooperative paradigm may not serve those 
whose goals are entirely value-driven.  To the extent a policy 
objective is to make the healthiest food available at the lowest prices 
to the people who need it most, in some cases a charitable non-profit 
organization may be the most effective vehicle for doing so.  As noted 
above, the challenging issues that consumer food cooperatives face in 
reconciling membership priorities may result in excluding certain 
potential members, often the people who are in the most need.  More 
generally, cooperatives operate primarily for the benefit of their 
members, which may limit the number of people they can impact.64  
In some cases “food access” objectives could be better advanced by 
non-profit organizations that serve a broad, public class of 
beneficiaries and are devoted exclusively to charitable purposes 
without balancing those purposes against the business imperatives of 
a cooperative. 
Perhaps the most visible examples of charitable non-profit 
organizations engaged in “food access” work are food pantries, food 
banks, and soup kitchens that distribute food at no cost to eligible 
recipients, funded entirely by grants and donations of money and 
food.65  While these emergency food providers certainly play an 
important role in combatting food insecurity,66 they are not 
alternatives to conventional corporate food enterprise in the sense 
that cooperatives are alternatives (i.e. they are not self-sustaining 
models that can exist without donations or other subsidies) and are 
therefore not the focus of this section.  Instead, this section examines 
the concept of charitable non-profits that sell food to paying 
customers at reduced costs. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom that charities rely primarily on 
donations and the common misconception that non-profits cannot be 
profitable, fees for services and goods in fact constitute the majority 
                                                                                                                 
 64. See Krishna, supra note 34, at 94. 
 65. See SAMUEL ECHEVARRIA ET AL., FEEDING AMERICA, FOOD BANKS: 
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of revenue generation for charitable non-profit organizations.67  A 
non-profit organization whose primary activity is selling food to low-
income customers at reduced costs can obtain tax exemption under 
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code if it can prove that 
doing so serves a “charitable purpose” recognized by the IRS.68  
Several organizations have recently done just that, innovating the 
concept of a non-profit grocery store.  A well-publicized example is 
the Daily Table, a tax-exempt non-profit retail store founded by 
former Trader Joe’s president Doug Rauch, which opened its doors in 
Dorchester, Massachusetts in 2015.69  The store offers a free 
membership program and collects information from its members to 
validate to the IRS that a predominant number of customers live in 
low-income ZIP codes.70  It is able to price its food at deep discounts 
by securing excess or overstocked items from other retailers, items 
that other retailers will no longer hold on the shelf but that still have a 
reasonable window of use past the “display code” date.71  The food is 
secured either through donations, or deeply discounted purchases, 
from those retailers.72  The organization also raises philanthropic 
funds from foundations and other donors, but it professes a goal of 
reaching a self-sustaining model where revenue from the sale of food 
covers costs entirely.73  Other non-profit grocery stores include Fare 
& Square in Chester, Pennsylvania, opened in 2014 as a project of the 
tax exempt non-profit organization Philabundance,74 and the Jubilee 
Food Market in Waco, Texas, opened in 2016 as a project of the tax 
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exempt non-profit organization Mission Waco.75  The non-profit 
approach to affordable food access is not limited to retail stores: 
charitable non-profit food hubs like the Corbin Hill Food Project, for 
example, seek to make fresh local produce more available in 
underserved communities by establishing and operating distribution 
networks.76 
An obvious advantage of the charitable non-profit approach is that, 
if tax exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 
non-profit grocery stores are eligible to receive tax-deductible 
donations, a powerful fundraising tool.77  Indeed, all three of the non-
profit grocers cited above have received support from large private 
foundations or donations.78  But even without the benefit of 
philanthropic fundraising, for those focused solely on making food as 
affordable as possible, the non-profit approach provides a structural 
advantage: unlike a cooperative or a traditional for-profit business, a 
non-profit can be organized for the sole purpose of pursuing such a 
goal, without having to balance that goal with profitability for the 
benefit of owners. 
However, those same structural features of non-profit 
organizations may thwart one of the central objectives associated with 
“food justice,” which is empowering communities and seeking 
grassroots, ground-up solutions to inequities in the food system.  Both 
scholars and activists have critiqued the non-profit sector as a “Non-
profit Industrial Complex” that dampens more radical grassroots 
community activism.79  One of the criticisms is that the demands of 
complying with regulations, fundraising, and appeasing grantors leads 
“non-profits to become increasingly professionalized and divorced 
from low-income communities, with boards consisting of donors and 
elite professionals, sometimes with tokenistic community 
membership, and with senior staff typically coming from relatively 
privileged backgrounds.”80  As with other options, the 
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appropriateness of a non-profit approach depends on a number of 
variables, including which “food justice” objectives and values are 
prioritized. 
CONCLUSION 
The Authors present a compelling case for promoting consumer 
and worker cooperatives as a means of building community wealth 
and power and redressing inequities in “food access” in low-income 
and minority communities.  This Response does not dispute that 
argument, but instead seeks to widen the scope of the Authors’ 
proposals and poses the question: why stop at cooperatives?  While 
acknowledging that cooperatives possess certain distinctive 
characteristics that make them well-suited as vehicles for reducing 
economic and health disparities in food systems, this Response has 
made the case that there are limits to relying on corporate form in 
crafting policy, and that strategies in this area should look not only to 
cooperatives but to a range of organizational models. 
What, then, does a more comprehensive strategy look like?  It 
could involve allocating funding and technical assistance to food 
projects primarily on the basis of the identity of the participants and 
the nature of the community impact, rather than solely on the basis of 
corporate form.  For example, the USDA’s Community Food Projects 
(“CFP”) Competitive Grant Program awards grants to projects in 
part based on alignment with stated goals that include “[meeting] the 
food needs of low-income individuals” and “[increasing] the self-
reliance of communities in providing for the food needs of the 
communities.”81  While grant applicants are required to be non-profit 
organizations, the projects themselves are not limited by corporate 
form: applicants are encouraged to partner with for-profit businesses 
and preference is given to proposals that “[s]upport the development 
of entrepreneurial projects” or “[d]evelop innovative connections 
between the for-profit and nonprofit food sectors”—with the 
common thread that all projects must serve low-income participants.82  
A consumer cooperative is one of many potential project structures 
the USDA cites as potentially serving the CFP goals.83  As another 
example, the New York City Housing Authority’s (“NYCHA”) Food 
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Business Pathways program provides training and resources to food 
entrepreneurs, with eligibility based not on organizational form but 
on the requirement that participants are NYCHA or NYCHA 
Section 8 residents.84  Finally, the Hot Bread Kitchen’s HBK 
Incubates program serves as a business incubator for a wide range of 
food entrepreneurs but with subsidized rates for low-income 
participants, who comprise thirty percent of all members.85 
This is not a comprehensive list and is by no means intended to 
suggest that existing resources are sufficient to meet the need in this 
area.  For example, the anticipated amount of funding available for 
the CFP program in 2018 is approximately $8.64 million, a relatively 
modest amount for a nationwide program.86  Rather, these programs 
illustrate a promising approach to build upon, complementing 
strategies focused on cooperatives, to remove barriers to entry for 
community-based food businesses and organizations of all varieties. 
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